La préférence pour les problèmes de décision monotones
Introduction
When a decision's payoff is subject to uncertainty, to what extent would a rational decision-maker accept to limit her choices against the possibility of obtaining extra information? At first sight, the answer rests on the value this information brings; but this in turn depends on what the constrained decision-maker will be capable of doing once she gets the additional data. 1 Much of individual or team training involves this precise tradeoff: training enables someone to get hold of relevant info, but it also formats a subject to act upon evidence in a certain way. The issue matters as well for organizations: firms must somewhat tie together their business units (especially those respectively in charge of product design and marketing) if they want to effectively gather and process relevant business intelligence (Gold et al. 2001) .
Oftentimes, the nature of the obtainable signals -be they numerical, like prices, or subject to measurement -will allow a decision-maker to rank them. Suppose, then, that the decision-maker knows a priori (or believes she knows) how to best react to any given signal. This characterizes a situation with so-called design attributes, where "(...) there is a great deal of a priori information about the form of the optimal solution, that is, about how the variables should be related." (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 90) In those circumstances, this paper shows that, in order to get information, the decision-maker will consent on having her choice set reduced to a list of graded moves. This result highlights two (objective or subjective) contextual features -rankable signals and design attributes -that will lead a rational decision-maker to precommit to view and handle an upcoming situation as a monotone decision problem. Recall that a decision problem is monotone if the decision-maker's observation of a higher signal leads her to choose a higher action. Problems of this sort have been recognized in many settings, such as production planning, financial management, insurance, auctions, contracting, and organizational design. Economists thus keep devoting substantial research effort to their analysis (see, e.g., Athey and Levin 2018, and the references therein). On a different note, this paper offers a first explanation for their prevalence.
One can also see this paper's result as a statement about automatic (or rule-based) versus controlled (or adaptive) decision processes. Dating back at least to Simon (1947) 's and Cyert and March (1963) 's respective accounts of the cognitive limitations of individuals and organizations, there is a sizable and growing literature dealing with bounded rationality and rational inattention (see, e.g., Conlisk 1996 , Rubinstein 1998 , Dessein et al. 2016 , and the references therein), which now draws largely on psychology and the neurosciences (e.g., Kahneman 2003 , Angner and Lowenstein 2007 , Camerer et al. 2005 .
This literature notably considers the fact that individuals and organizations often sacrifice on extensive deliberation in exchange for greater awareness of their environment. A generic type of behavior is to develop appropriate reflexes, production habits, standard operating procedures, or routines, the latter meaning that "(...) the parts of an individual's skill which are completely routinized are the parts that he or she does not have to think about -once a routine is switched on in the worker's mind, it goes on to end without further consultation of the higher faculties." (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 63) We model this conduct as having the choice set reduced to a list of labelled subsets of specific values the decision variables can take; once a given label is picked, all the decision variables are determined. According to our main proposition, a rational decision-maker with enough a priori knowledge will stick to such a scheme in order to grab an informative signal.
The upcoming section will now lay down the mathematical background for this result.
Section 3 contains the formal proposition and its demonstration. A concluding Section 4 brings further remarks and observations.
Notation and definitions
Consider a decision-making entity (which can be an individual or an organization) with preferences over a set of outcomes  ∈ Υ represented by a valuation (utility, profit, welfare) function  : Υ → R. The outcomes stem from a transformation  : X × Ω → Υ, an instance of it is written  =  (; ), where  ∈ X denotes the decision variables and  ∈ Ω is an uncertain state of the world. The decision-maker's prior beliefs about the latter are encoded in the probability space (Ω F P), where F is a -algebra of subsets (events) of Ω, and P : F → [0 1] is a probability measure. Assume that, for every , the composite application  •  (; ·) : Ω → Υ is integrable with respect to P; the decisionmaker's choice then evolves around the expected valuation E P [ ( (; ))], where E P refers to the expectation operator based on P.
For some measurable space ( Γ), where  is an arbitrary set (of real numbers, for instance) and Γ is a -algebra of subsets of , let Θ : Ω →  be a measurable mapping taking values in . We interpret a realization  = Θ() as a signal about the state of the world . With no loss of generality, we assume that Θ is surjective (or onto), i.e.
The decision-maker could readily seek an element of X that maximizes E P [ ( (; ))].
Alternatively, she could first commit to a restricted choice set 4 X ⊂ X in exchange for the ability to observe Θ(), then choose in 4 X a maximizer of the conditional (or revised) expected valuation E P [ ( (; )) | Θ()]. Which path would she go for? Two key notions must be defined before we provide a formal answer to this question.
Recall that a chain is a totally ordered set.
Definition 1: A routine is an injective (or one-to-one) function  :
This definition renders the idea conveyed in the introduction that a routine is like a dial, a knob, a switch or a tuning device. The chain →  stands for a graduated ring or strip.
Once a spot  on →  is hit, specific values of the decision variables are triggered through (), and no other spot  0 on →  activates exactly the same values.
The second notion now evokes some way to represent the objects of a set.
Definition 2: A set  parametrizes a set  if there is a bijective (or one-to-one and onto) function  :  →  .
A parameter  ∈  thus acts as a label, a code name, or a sticker uniquely ascribed to an object () =  ∈ . Knowing , one knows , and vice-versa.
Main result
The issue raised at the start of this paper can now be answered as follows. Proof: Observe that, for all  ∈ X , 
The function takes values in X and its domain is a chain. But it may not be one-to-one.
We can nevertheless use it to construct a routine. Since() = (), we have that
Take the subset of
Taking stock of this relationship, the above inequality becomes
The latter holds for any  ∈ X , so (...) it is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of operations which we can perform without thinking about them.
Concluding remarks
When a decision's payoff is subject to uncertainty, we showed that a decision-making entity (an individual or an organization) could set the matter so as to be facing a monotone decision problem. Sufficient conditions for this to occur are that the entity be ex ante capable of (i) holding prior expectations on the additional information she could possibly get, (ii) encoding and ranking the observed extra signals, and (iii) using any received signal optimally. In exchange for the possibility of getting an informative signal, the entity will then commit to use a restricted choice set made of graded marks pointing at specific values of the decision variables.
This result constitutes a first explanation for the repeated occurrence of monotone decision problems in economic life. It suggests that these problems should necessarily (not exclusively, of course) prevail in stable recurrent circumstances, when a priori knowledge and skills are significant. They arise from the desire to then take advantage of this cognitive state (design attributes), by implementing reliable routines that economize on 8 deliberation in order to enhance external awareness.
The construction method invoked in the Theorem's proof was deliberately abstract and general, in order to recoup as many situations as possible. It also was rather unspecific about the implemented routine, apart from the requirement that it should point at contingent value-maximizers. One upshot is that, if several such maximizers exist, then two otherwise identical decision-making entities could adopt different routines, even if they hold similar preferences and beliefs. Additionally, if the first inequality in the above proof is strict, then there would even be room for suboptimal routines. This might support an amount of conservatism towards maintaining (slightly) obsolete production habits. It might also account for the presence of X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966 ) and low-hanging fruits (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 1998) in organizations.
